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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
On May 22, 2003, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision granting 
defendant's motion for summary judgment. (Addendum at pp. 1-7; hereinafter "Add. 
") On June 16, 2003, the trial court issued a Summary Judgment And Order Of 
Dismissal (the "Order"), which was entered by the Clerk on June 20. (Record at p. 280; 
hereinafter "Rec. ) The Order dismissed the Complaint, with prejudice, on the merits. 
Plaintiff filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the Order on July 14, 2003. (Rec. 291) 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against 
Plaintiffs takings claim based on a ruling that Plaintiff had no protected property 
interest in operating a gravel pit because gravel pits require a conditional use 
permit. 
This legal ruling was made on a motion for summary judgment, and is therefore 
subject to de novo review. Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996). Plaintiff 
filed a timely Notice of Appeal (Rec. 291), which preserved this error for appeal. Rule 3, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
II. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against 
Plaintiffs takings claim based on a factual finding that Plaintiff failed to make a 
meaningful attempt satisfy one of the County's purported requirements for granting 
a gravel pit permit. 
This factual finding was made on a motion for summary judgment, and is 
therefore subject to de novo review. Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996). 
Plaintiff filed a timely Notice of Appeal (Rec. 291), which preserved this error for appeal. 
Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
III. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against 
Plaintiff's takings claims based on a factual finding that the denial of the requested 
permit did not prevent all economically beneficial use of Plaintiffs property. 
This finding was made on a motion for summary judgment, and is therefore 
subject to de novo review. Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996). Plaintiff 
filed a timely Notice of Appeal (Rec. 291), which preserved this error for appeal. Rule 3, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides (the portion 
relevant to this case is in bold): 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual 
service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for 
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
Article I, Section 22, of the Utah Constitution provides that: 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
This case presents a "takings" claim under the United States and Utah 
Constitutions, both of which require compensation if the government "takes" private 
property for public use. Plaintiff purchased a parcel of land in Toole County (the 
"County") for the sole purpose of operating a commercial gravel pit. Under the County's 
zoning ordinance, gravel pits require a permit. Plaintiff applied for the necessary permit, 
but the County denied that request. Since Plaintiffs land has no other viable economic 
use, the County's action rendered plaintiffs land worthless. 
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 2886 
(1992), the Supreme Court held that when regulatory actions deprive property owners of 
all economically viable uses of their property, there is a "taking" and the property owner 
must be compensated. Plaintiffs claim falls directly under this decision. 
The trial court, without mentioning Lucas (although it was heavily cited in the 
parties' briefs), granted the County's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed 
Plaintiffs takings claim. The trial noted that gravel pit operations require a conditional 
use permit, which means the County had the discretion to deny Plaintiffs request for 
such a permit. The trial court reasoned that if the County could legitimately deny the 
permit request, Plaintiff had no "protected interest" in operating a gravel pit, and 
therefore there could be no "taking." For the trial court, therefore, the legitimacy of the 
government's regulatory action was the key. 
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This is not, however, the correct analysis for a takings claim, and it directly 
conflicts with Lucas. A takings claim under Lucas does not question the legitimacy of 
the government's actions. Indeed, Lucas assumes that the government's actions are 
wholly legitimate. The issue under Lucas is whether the government's actions, even 
though proper, interfere with property rights to such a severe degree that that 
compensation is required. The underlying policy is that if regulatory actions in the public 
interest impose sufficiently onerous restraints on the ability to use private property in a 
productive way, the public is effectively appropriating that property for public purposes, 
and should pay the cost of that appropriation. 
Whether the County had the right to reject Plaintiffs gravel pit permit request is 
therefore irrelevant. The pertinent question under Lucas is whether the County's actions 
had the effect of depriving Plaintiff of all economically viable use of the property. If the 
County's action had that effect, there has been a taking that requires compensation. Since 
the plaintiff submitted evidence that the County's actions had this exact effect, summary 
judgment should not have been granted. 
Statement Of Facts 
There is no dispute that Plaintiff applied for and was denied a permit to operate a 
gravel pit. There is also no dispute that the zoning ordinance gave the County the 
discretion to deny such a request. There are, however, two factual findings in the trial 
court's decision that were not appropriate on summary judgment: 
The trial court found that Plaintiff failed to submit a required environmental 
impact statement, and that for this reason Plaintiff "made no meaningful attempt to 
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satisfy the requirements for the granting of a conditional use permit...." (Add. 5) The 
undisputed facts do not support this finding. 
• The trial court found that without a gravel pit "the property can be put to 
the same reasonable or economically beneficial uses it has historically had...." (Add. 6) 
The undisputed facts do not support this finding, either. 
This Statement of Facts, therefore, is primarily directed towards showing that the 
record contains evidence contrary to these two findings, and that the trial court therefore 
erred in making those findings. Since the trial court made its findings on a motion for 
summary judgment, the evidence in the record, and all inferences that can be drawn from 
that evidence, must be viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff Diamond B-Y Ranches purchased 1931A acres of land in Tooele County 
(the "County") immediately north of the Stockton Town limits. The property contains a 
very valuable gravel pit. Historically, gravel has always been extracted from Plaintiffs 
property and the property has never been used for any other purpose. (Rec. 167) 
Plaintiff purchased the property for the specific purpose of either conducting its own 
gravel pit operation or selling it to a gravel mining company. Id. Prior to purchasing the 
property, Plaintiff asked the County Engineer whether it could set up a gravel pit on the 
property, and was assured it would be able to do so. Id. 
At the time of the purchase, the land was zoned MU-40 under the Uniform Zoning 
Ordinance of Tooele County, a classification that includes use of the land for: 
Mining, rock crusher, batch plan, asphalt plant, quarry, Gravel pits, and oil 
or steam wells. (Emphasis added) 
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MU-40 was, at the time, the only zoning classification that permitted mining of 
any kind, including gravel pits. Id. 
"MU" under the Tooele County Zoning Ordinance stands for "Multiple Use" and 
is applied to areas where the County wants to discourage residential development: 
The purposes of providing a Multiple Use District are to establish 
areas in mountain, hillside, canyon, mountain valley, desert, and other open 
and generally undeveloped lands where human habitation would be limited 
in order to protect land and open space resources; to reduce unreasonable 
requirements for public utility and service expenditures through 
uneconomic and unwise dispersal and scattering of population; to 
encourage use of land, where appropriate, for forestry, grazing, agriculture, 
mining.... 
(Rec. 167,118) 
There is one other crucial fact about the Plaintiffs property. It contains a 
substantial section of an apparently unique geologic formation known as the Stockton 
Bar, a ridge of gravel and sand about one hundred feet high that runs for several miles. 
The ridge was created many eons ago by Lake Bonneville. It is the Stockton Bar that 
contains the valuable gravel. (Rec. 167-66) 
On July 12, 2002, an application was submitted for a Conditional Use Permit (the 
"Application") to operate a crushing, screening and wash plant for sand and gravel 
processing.1 (Rec. 166) An Application of this type is first reviewed by the Tooele 
County Planning Commission (the "Planning Commission"). Opposition to the 
Application emerged within days of its submission to the Planning Commission. Id. 
The Application was originally submitted by Geneva Rock Products, Inc., a company 
Plaintiff had contracted to sell the property to. The sale to Geneva Rock was never 
consummated and Plaintiff subsequently took over the Application. (Rec. 166) 
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The Planning Commission first discussed the Application at a Work Meeting on 
July 19, 2000. Although this was just a week after the Application had been submitted, 
staff member Thomas Cluff reported the following: 
Tom stated the site of the proposed operation is very close to the Town of 
Stockton, raising the possibility of unacceptable adverse impacts on 
Stockton's quality of life. 
Mining out a section of the bar could potentially expose Stockton to more 
of the odors created by the landfill's composting operation. 
The Department of Engineering has received information from the 
University of Utah outlining the critical importance of the Stockton Bar as a 
"geoantiquity." The bar is one of the most important sources of scientific 
and historical data on the life cycle of Lake Bonneville. Stockton Bar is 
nearly unique in the western hemisphere for the significance and type of 
landform that it represents. 
The Stockton Bar has already suffered from some negative impacts but still 
remains about 90% intact. Gravel pits are by far the most potentially 
destructive impact to the bar. 
Students doing graduate work on the bar have identified a potentially 
endangered species of plant that grows there. 
The County Engineer has expressed concern that mining through the bar 
could disrupt the bar's function as an air dam between Tooele and Rush 
valleys. 
(Rec. 166-65, 105) 
In addition to this negative report, the minutes of the July 19 meeting show that at 
least four residents of the community appeared at the meeting to speak against the 
Application. No one from either the community or the Planning Commission spoke in 
favor of the Application. (Rec. 165) 
Mr. Cluff suggested that the Planning Commission request an Environmental 
Impact Statement ("EIS")> at Plaintiffs expense, by an independent firm of the County's 
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choosing. Although Christy Kane, one of the six members of the Planning Commission, 
sought to vote on the application at that meeting without waiting for an EIS, the Planning 
Commission decided to await an EIS. Id 
The need for an EIS, however, was immediately put on hold. On July 20, 2000, 
the very next day after the Planning Commission had requested the EIS, the County 
declared a six-month moratorium on all gravel pit permits. Id. The County had concerns 
about allowing any more gravel pit in areas zoned MU-40 and decided to review its entire 
approach towards gravel pits. The moratorium meant that no further action would be 
taken on the Plaintiffs Application until the County's overall policy towards gravel pits 
had been thoroughly re-examined. Id. 
On January 23, 2001, the six-month moratorium expired. The County enacted a 
new Ordinance (Ordinance 2001-05) that created MG-EX, a new zoning classification for 
solely for "mining, quarry, sand and gravel excavation." Gravel pits would no longer be 
permitted in land zoned MU-40. Id. The Ordinance further provided that the County 
would designate areas for MG-EX zoning. Plaintiffs parcel was not designated by the 
County for inclusion in the new zoning classification. (Rec. 164) 
This was, for all practical purposes, a denial of Plaintiff s gravel pit Application. 
The County reviewed its entire policy towards gravel pits and decided they should only 
be permitted in certain very limited areas. Plaintiffs property was not one of those areas. 
Id 
Despite the failure to have its property included in an area that would permit 
gravel mining under the new zoning ordinance, Plaintiff continued to try to get its 
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Application approved. On January 24, 2001, right after the new Ordinance was enacted 
and the moratorium lifted, Plaintiffs counsel wrote the County Engineer requesting that: 
(1) it continue to consider the pending Application on a grandfathered basis under the old 
zoning ordinance, because it was submitted before the ordinance was modified, and in the 
alternative, (2) that the County consider re-zoning Plaintiffs property to the new MG-EX 
zoning classification. Thus, two tracks developed at this point; a review of the pending 
Application for a Conditional Use Permit under the old zoning ordinance, and a request 
that Plaintiffs property be re-zoned to the new MG-EX zoning class. Id. 
The Planning Commission met on February 7, 2001, to discuss the pending 
Application for a Conditional Use Permit. (Rec. 163) This was the grandfathered request 
in which the permit would be reviewed under the old ordinance. A number of 
community members spoke in opposition, including the Mayor of Stockton. The 
objections voiced at this meeting primarily arose out of concerns about having a gravel 
pit so close to the town of Stockton. Once again, no one spoke in favor of the proposed 
gravel pit. The Planning Commission renewed its request for an Environmental Impact 
Statement and took no action on the Permit Application. Id. 
About a month and a half later, on March 21, the Planning Commission met to 
consider Plaintiffs alternative request to re-zone its property to the new MG-EX zone. 
The Planning Commission decided at this meeting to recommend that the County deny 
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this rezoning request.2 The Findings Of Fact And Decision issued in support of that 
recommendation recite the following reasons for that recommendation: 
• Two scientists from the University of Utah provided information about the 
importance of the Stockton Bar as a "geoantiquity" that should be preserved in its 
natural state. 
• The County Engineer feared that the gravel pit would disrupt the bar's 
function as an air dam between Tooele and Rush valleys which would change 
climate and temperature. 
• Mayor Thomas of the Town of Stockton stated that there would be too 
many environmental impacts on the community. 
• Residents of the Town of Stockton had raised numerous objections at 
public hearings, all relating to perceived health and safety problems the gravel pit 
would create. 
(Rec. 163-62) 
The Planning Commission never cited the need for an EIS as a reason 
recommending that the County deny the re-zoning request, and no EIS was ever 
requested in connection with the re-zoning request. The Planning Commission, therefore, 
decided to recommend against permitting a gravel pit at Plaintiffs site for reasons having 
nothing to do with the lack of an EIS. (Rec. 162) 
The Tooele County Board of Commissioners ("County Board") took up Plaintiffs 
re-zoning request and held three hearings on April 17, May 1 and May 22. At all three 
hearings community members voiced the same objections as they had before the Planning 
Commission, arguing that the health and safety risks were too great. Professors from the 
2
 The Planning Commission does not make decisions on such matters; the Tooele County 
Board of Commissioners does. The Planning Commission reviews such matters and 
makes recommendations to the County Board. (Rec. 163) 
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University of Utah also continued to argue against any disturbance of the Stockton Bar. 
(Rec. 162) 
On May 22, 2001, the County Board voted to deny Plaintiffs re-zoning request. 
Id. While there is no recorded statement of the County Board's reasons, there is no 
evidence that the lack of an EIS played any role in this decision. As noted above, no EIS 
had ever been requested in connection with the re-zoning request. The objections to the 
re-zoning request centered on health and safety concerns and the desire to preserve the 
Stockton Bar, problems an EIS could not alleviate. As an article in the Deseret News 
reporting on the County Board's decision stated: "The Stockton Bar is saved." Id. 
The denial of the re-zoning request is crucial. If the County Board had intended to 
allow a gravel pit at Plaintiffs site, it would have voted to re-zone. The County had now 
twice rejected having a gravel pit on Plaintiffs property, first by passing the new MG-EX 
zoning ordinance and not including Plaintiffs property in the areas that could be mined, 
and then, by rejecting the Plaintiffs request to be re-zoned MG-EX. Neither of these 
rejections was in any way based on the lack of an EIS. (Rec. 162-61) 
Despite this denial of the re-zoning request, Plaintiff continued to pursue the 
"grandfathered" application under the old zoning ordinance. Since the Planning 
Commission had requested an EIS in support of the application, Plaintiff sent out letters 
seeking bids to seven engineering firms that had been approved by the Planning 
Commission. Five never responded. Two responded, but they offered to perform only 
part of the work, and would have charged in excess of $100,000 for the limited work they 
11 
proposed to do. Plaintiff thus determined that it was not possible to procure the EIS 
requested by the Planning Commission. (Rec. 161, 80-79) 
Plaintiffs counsel sent a letter to the Planning Commission informing it that the 
requested EIS was not obtainable, and that even the limited work two firms were willing 
to do would have cost an unreasonable amount of money. (Rec. 80-79) In a continuing 
attempt to accommodate any reasonable conditions the Planning Commission might seek 
to impose, Plaintiff offered to abide by "the same conditions imposed on any of those 
three conditional use permits" for gravel pits that had been approved in the prior year. Id. 
The Planning Commission met on July 18, 2001, to consider Plaintiffs 
Application and recommended that it be rejected. The Findings Of Fact And Statement 
Of Law And Decision issued by the Planning Commission in support of this 
recommendation cites a series of objections inherent in the very concept of a gravel pit on 
Plaintiffs property: 
• Professors from the University of Utah had shown that the Stockton Bar 
was a unique "geoantiquity" that should not be disturbed. 
• The County Engineer feared that the mine would disrupt the bar's function 
as an air dam and change the region's climate and temperature. 
• The Mayor of Stockton stated that there would be adverse environmental 
impact on the community. 
• The proposed pit would be located within lA mile of a residential area and 
would give off odors and dust. 
• Residents were concerned about numerous health and safety issues. 
(Rec. 161-60, 72; see also, Rec. 77) 
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The Planning Commission's Findings of Fact mentions that an EIS had been 
requested, but never states that the lack of an EIS played any role in the recommendation 
to deny the Application. (Rec. 160, 72) Indeed, prior to the meeting, the Planning 
Commission's staff submitted a suggested Findings Of Facts, Statement Of Law And 
Recommendation that specifically cited that lack of an EIS as a reason for recommending 
the denial of Plaintiff s Application. (Rec. 90) The Planning Commission adopted most 
of the Staffs suggested Findings, but not the language about the lack of an EIS. (Rec. 
160, 72) Thus, the Planning Commission did not consider the lack of an EIS relevant to 
its recommendation. 
On September 11, 2001, the Planning Commission's recommendation came before 
the County Board, which rejected Plaintiffs Application by a two to one vote. The 
statements of the two Board Members who voted against the Application never mention 
the lack of an EIS: 
Commissioner White stated his reasoning for being opposed to this is that 
he feels the health and safety of the citizens of Stockton can be in danger if 
that type of thing is put within that short of distance of the housing. "We're 
talking between lA and Vi of a mile and lA mile, somewhere in that range. I 
think it would definitely reduce the quality of life of the people whom 
might live there as well. I think the health and safety has a compelling 
interest over the landowner's use.... 
Commissioner Rockwell stated he would echo the same thing. Because of 
the proximity to the Town of Stockton and its citizens, this property is not 
the place to put the gravel pit and related operations. 
(Rec. 160,64) 
The sentiments reflected in these comments are consistent the County's desire to 
limit gravel pit operations to very remote areas, as reflected in the creation of the new 
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MG-EX zoning classification and the refusal to include Plaintiffs parcel in that new 
zone. The County thus decided it did not want a gravel pit on Plaintiffs parcel primarily 
because it considered it to be too close to the town of Stockton. 
Absent the ability to operate a gravel pit, Plaintiff is left with property that has no 
viable use. Plaintiffs real estate expert, Butch Johnson, opined as follows: 
15. Since the property is not fenced, does not have a well, or other 
evidence of any historical agricultural use, it is my opinion that the property 
as zoned could not be economically operated for forestry, grazing, 
agricultural of recreational purposes. 
16. It is my opinion, based on my experience and training, that the only 
economical viable use of the Diamond B-Y property would be for the 
extraction of sand and gravel. 
(Rec. 158-56) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs takings claim for three reasons. (Add. 4-6) 
First, the court ruled that since gravel pits require a "conditional use" permit under the 
County's zoning ordinance, the County could legitimately deny the request. The court 
then reasoned that if the request could be denied, Plaintiff had no "protected interest" in 
operating a gravel pit, and therefore there could be no takings claim. The ruling was 
error because under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 
2886 (1992), takings claims assume that the government had acted legitimately. The 
basis for a takings claim under Lucas is that even legitimate regulatory actions - such as 
the denial of a permit — require compensation if the effect is to eliminate all 
economically viable use of a parcel of private property. Even legitimate regulatory 
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actions can impose such severe restrictions on the rights of a property owner that the 
government's actions constitute a public taking of private property for public use. The 
trial court erred, therefore, in granting the County's summary judgment motion, because 
Plaintiff submitted evidence that the County's actions removed any possible 
economically viable use of Plaintiff s property, which automatically constitutes a 
compensable taking under Lucas. 
The trial court's second and alternative basis for denying Plaintiffs takings claim 
was a determination that Plaintiff never made a meaningful attempt to meet the County's 
requirements for a gravel pit permit. The trial court reached this conclusion based on a 
finding that the County required an environmental impact statement ("EIS") as a 
condition for granting a gravel pit permit, and Plaintiff never obtained the required EIS. 
This ruling is error because it is based on a factual finding where the evidence created a 
disputed issue of fact. 
While it is true the Planning Commission asked for an EIS, and further, that 
Plaintiff did not submit an EIS, there is no basis for concluding from this that Plaintiff 
never made a meaningful attempt to meet the County's requirements. Plaintiff produced 
overwhelming evidence showing that the lack of an EIS played no role in the County's 
denial of Plaintiff s permit application. The County rejected Plaintiffs application 
because in the County's view the proposed gravel pit was simply too close to the nearby 
town of Stockton, something an EIS could never change. Plaintiffs also showed that the 
requested EIS was impossible to obtain. Plaintiff sought bids from seven firms approved 
by the County, but not a single one said they could provide the EIS requested by the 
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County. The evidence, therefore, shows that Plaintiff actually made extraordinary efforts 
to comply with the County's zoning requirements, and did so in the face of repeated 
denials of its request to operate a gravel pit. The court erred, therefore, in granting 
summary judgment based on this "finding." 
Finally, the trial court rejected Plaintiffs takings claim because of a finding that 
the property can be put to the same historical use that it is was put to before the request 
for a gravel pit permit was denied. This ruling was error because it is based on a factual 
finding where the evidence created a disputed issue of fact. Plaintiff submitted direct, 
expert testimony that the only economically viable use for the property is as a gravel pit. 
Thus, summary judgment could not have been granted on this basis, either. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
Plaintiffs claims are brought pursuant to provisions of the United States and Utah 
Constitutions that prohibit the "taking" of private property by the government without 
compensation. When a "taking" occurs it does not matter whether the government's 
actions are reasonable or in the public interest. Takings claims focus on the effect of 
governmental actions, not their legitimacy. The policy underlying "takings" 
jurisprudence is that if private property is appropriated for the public good, the public 
should bear the cost of that decision, not the private landowner. Plaintiffs claim, 
therefore, does not question the validity or wisdom of Tooele County's denial of 
Plaintiffs gravel pit permit application. The question is whether the effect of that action 
is sufficient to constitute a taking that entitles Plaintiff to compensation. 
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Plaintiffs claim involves what is referred to as a "regulatory taking." Takings law 
initially concerned physical invasions or appropriations of private property. A seminal 
decision by Justice Holmes in 1922, however, ruled that at some point the mere 
regulation of property can have the same effect as appropriation and therefore constitute a 
taking that entitles the property owner to compensation: 
[Wjhile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too 
far it will be recognized as a taking. 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415, 43 S.Ct. 158, 160 (1922). 
The precise question raised by this case, therefore is whether the County was 
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs claim that the County's actions constitute a 
"regulatory taking." The trial court rejected Plaintiffs regulatory takings claim on three 
alternative grounds: 
• Extracting gravel requires a conditional use permit under the Toole County 
zoning ordinance, which means that the County had the right to deny Plaintiffs permit 
request. Based on this, the trial court ruled that Plaintiff had no "protected interest" in 
operating a gravel pit, and there could therefore be no taking by the government. 
• Plaintiff failed to obtain an environmental impact statement that the County 
allegedly required as a condition of issuing the permit, which means there can be no 
takings claim based on the denial of the permit. 
• Plaintiff has alternative uses for the property, and therefore there is no 
taking by the County. 
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Plaintiff will separately examine each of these alternative bases for the trial court's 
ruling. 
I. The Trial Court Erred In Granting Summary 
Judgment Based On The Fact That Gravel 
Pits Require A Conditional Use Permit 
The trial court analyzed Plaintiffs takings claim by first determining if Plaintiff 
had a "protected property interest" in operating a gravel pit. It is undisputed that Plaintiff 
owns the subject property. By protected property interest, the trial court was referring to 
an interest in using the land as a gravel pit. Since the County could and did legitimately 
deny the request for a gravel pit permit under the applicable zoning ordinance, the trial 
court concluded that there was no protected property interest in operating a gravel pit. In 
trial court's view, this was dispositive of Plaintiff s takings claim, because absent a 
protected property interest, the trial court thought there could be no takings claim. With 
respect, this is an incorrect analysis under takings law, and indeed, trial court did not cite 
a single takings law decision supporting this analysis. 
The fundamental error in the trial court's analysis is the failure to distinguish 
takings claims from actions that challenge the legitimacy of regulator/ decisions. 
Landowners who are denied a request to use land in a certain way can challenge the 
legitimacy of regulator's actions if they believe denial was inconsistent with the 
applicable zoning ordinance, or for some other reason improper. Generally, the question 
in these cases is whether the regulator's actions were so unreasonable as to be arbitrary 
and capricious. E.g.,Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032 
(Utah 1984). 
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A takings claim, in contrast, assumes that the regulatory actions were lawful. The 
focus of a takings claim is not the reasonableness of the government's actions, but rather 
the effect. Certain regulatory actions so severely limit property owners' ability to use 
their property productively that they constitute a taking for which the government must 
provide compensation. The trial court, therefore, rejected plaintiffs takings claim based 
on a factor - the legitimacy of the decision to deny the permit - that is irrelevant to a 
takings analysis. Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. U.S., 791 F.2d 893, 900 (C.A.Fed. 
1986) ("the question has got to be faced whether the impact of the regulation here 
involved was sufficiently severe ... and the unchallengeable legality in this proceeding of 
the regulatory act here involved, does not answer the question or even lead towards the 
answer"). 
A. The Basic Principles Of "Regulatory Takings" 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that: 
[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.3 
Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution provides that: 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation.4 
The Fifth Amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. 
Chicago, Burlington & Q R D v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 17 S.Ct. 581 (1897). 
4
 Plaintiffs claim is brought under both the U.S. and Utah constitutional takings 
provisions. Plaintiff cites exclusively federal cases because they contain a more 
developed body of law on regulatory takings. Furthermore, the Utah Constitution's 
clause is broader than the Fifth Amendment's takings provision. It includes not only 
taking, but also "damage," to private property. See, NJD, Ltd. v. City of San Dimas, 2 
Cal.Rptr.3d 818, 822 (Cal.App. 2nd Dist. 2003). Since Plaintiff will show that 
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As noted above, there are two categories of takings under these provisions, those 
that involve physical invasions or appropriations of property, and those that involve 
regulations that limit or preclude the use of private property. Waste Management, Inc. of 
Tennessee v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, 130 F.3d 731, 
737 (6th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff alleges only a regulatory taking. 
There are two tests that determine whether there has been a regulatory taking. 
Anderson v. Charter Township ofYpsilanti, 266 F.3d 487, 493 (6th Cir. 2001). First, 
under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992), if 
the regulatory action deprives the property owner of all economically viable use of his or 
her property, this is called a categorical taking, and compensation is automatically due. 
Second, if regulatory action triggers a significant, but not absolute, deprivation of the 
ability to use property, under Penn. Central Transp, Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 
104, 124 S.Ct. 2646 (1978), a balancing test is applied to determine if there has been a 
taking. See, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe, 535 U.S. 302, 326, 122 
S.Ct. 1465, 1481 (U.S. 2002) ("we still resist the temptation to adopt per se rules in our 
cases involving partial regulatory takings, preferring to examine 'a number of factors' 
rather than a simple 'mathematically precise' formula"). 
Plaintiff will demonstrate that the trial court's "protected property interest" 
analysis was incorrect under both the Lucas categorical takings analysis and the Penn 
Central balancing test. 
defendant's summary judgment motion should have been denied under federal precedent, 
it follows that summary judgment must also be denied for the Utah Constitutional claim. 
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B. The Trial Court's "Protected Property Interest" Analysis 
Is Irrelevant To A Categorical Takings Claim Under Lucas. 
Regulatory action that deprives a property owner of all economically viable use of 
property constitutes a taking under the Fifth Amendment. This is called a "categorical 
taking" because there is no balancing of the state's interests against the property owner's 
interests. When there is a categorical taking, the property owner has an absolute right to 
compensation. Kith Energy, Inc. v. U.S., 247 F.3d 1355, 1362 (C.A.Fed. 2001) ("A 
categorical taking has been defined as one in which 'all economically viable use, i.e., all 
economic value, has been taken by the regulatory imposition'"). 
The United State Supreme Court's definitive articulation of this doctrine, Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992), concerned a 
situation in which the state prohibited the plaintiff from developing housing on 
beachfront property because of environmental concerns about the preservation of the 
beachfront. The Court held that this prohibition constituted a taking because it left no 
other use for the property: 
[W]e have found categorical treatment appropriate ... where regulation 
denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land. 
Id., 505 U.S. at 1015, 112 S.Ct. at 2893. 
The Court explained the reason for this: 
[Regulations that leave the owner of land without economically beneficial 
or productive options for its use - typically, as here, by requiring land to be 
left substantially in its natural state - carry with them a heightened risk that 
private property is being pressed into some form of public service under the 
guise of mitigating serious public harm. 
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Id, 505 U.S. at 1018, 112 S.Ct. at 2894-95. The Court thus held that if the public takes 
away all productive use of a parcel of land, the land is effectively being placed in public 
service. The public, therefore, and not the private property owner, should bear the cost of 
that decision. 
With a categorical taking under Lucas, there is no inquiry into the 
reasonableness of the government's action: 
The jury also could have found the City liable for a taking because it 
denied Del Monte all economically viable use of its property. Where such 
a taking is absolute, no inquiry into the state's interest advanced in support 
of the regulation is required. 
Del Monte Dunes at Monterey v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1432 (9th Cir. 1996), 
affd, City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 708, 119 S.Ct. 1624 (1999). See 
also, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 122 
S.Ct. 1465, 1483 (2002) ("categorical rule" that "compensation is required when a 
regulation deprives an owner of 'all economically beneficial uses' of his land"). 
The trial court's analysis is erroneous for Plaintiffs Lucas categorical takings 
claim. The statute at issue in Lucas precluded development of owner's beachfront 
property. Since this was a legitimate state statute, under the trial court's reasoning, the 
property owner would have had no "protected property interest" in developing that 
beachfront property. That fact, however, was irrelevant to the analysis in Lucas. The 
sole issue was whether the regulatory action had the effect of depriving the property 
owner of all economically viable use of the property. If it did, there was a taking that 
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required compensation. Takings claims under Lucas focus on the effect of governmental 
actions, not their legitimacy. 
There are no exceptions to the Lucas categorical takings doctrine, and it does not 
matter whether the statute or regulation that precludes economically viable use of the 
property came into effect before or after the property owner acquired the property. In 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 121 S.Ct. 2448 (2001), for example, the 
plaintiff owned a parcel of waterfront land. He brought a takings claim when his 
development proposals were repeatedly denied by the local government because of 
potential damage to a salt marsh. The regulations at issue were perhaps even stricter than 
those at issue here. Anyone wishing to fill in a salt marsh needed a "special exception" 
from a regulatory body, and that body had full discretion to deny any such requested 
exemptions. Id. at 613. 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs takings claim, principally 
because the plaintiff acquired the properly after the applicable salt march regulation went 
into effect. The court reasoned that since the regulation was in effect before he became 
the owner, "the right to fill wetlands was not part of the title he acquired." Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island, 746 A.2d 707, 716 (R.I. 2000). The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that if a regulation deprives a property owner of all economically viable use, it does not 
matter that the regulation was in effect at the time the owner acquired the property. 533 
U.S. at 626-29, 121 S.Ct. at 2462-64. 
This discussion of basic, well-settled, takings law shows that the trial court's first 
basis for granting summary judgment was error. The trial court dismissed the takings 
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claim because the County had a right under its zoning ordinance to deny Plaintiffs 
request for a gravel pit permit. As the above discussion shows, this is irrelevant to a 
takings analysis. Takings claims assume the government has the right to deny a 
requested use of property, and focus instead on the effect of those actions. Compensation 
is due if regulatory action deprives the property owner of all economically viable use of 
their property, regardless of how reasonable or noble the intentions of the regulatory body 
might be. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 2886 
(1992). Plaintiff submitted evidence that the County's actions deprived its property of all 
economically viable use. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to a trial on its takings claim. 
C. The Trial Court's "Protected Property Interest" 
Analysis Is Irrelevant To A Takings Claim 
Under The Penn Central Balancing Test. 
A taking can occur where regulatory actions deprive owners of some, but not all, 
use of their property. In noncategorical takings claims, the question of whether a taking 
has occurred requires the application of a balancing that involves several factors: 
an "ad hoc factual inquir[y]," in which three factors have been identified 
that "have particular significance in the takings inquiry: (1) the economic 
impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the 
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations; and 
(3) the character of the governmental action. 
Anderson v. Charter Township ofYpsilanti, 266 F.3d 487, 493 (6th Cir. 2001). 
This balancing test is generally referred to as the Penn Central test because it was 
first articulated by the Supreme Court in Penn. Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 
438 U.S. 104, 124 S.Ct. 2646 (1978). See, Contiv. U.S., 291 F.3d 1334, 1339 (C.A.Fed. 
2002) ("When a taking is determined to be non-categorical, the court must embark on a 
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fact-based inquiry in which it applies the standard promulgated by the Supreme Court in 
Perm Central"); Keshbro, Inc. v. City of Miami, 801 So.2d 864, 871 (Fla. 2001) ("Those 
regulations which fall short of effecting a categorical taking are appropriately analyzed 
under the ad-hoc factual inquiry outlined in Penn Central). 
To the extent the County's actions do not constitute a categorical taking, the trier 
of fact would have to apply the Penn Central balancing test to determine if there has been 
a taking. The sole fact relied on by the trial court - that the County could legitimately 
deny Plaintiffs request for a gravel pit permit - would be relevant to the "character of the 
government's actions," which is one of the three main components of this test. That one 
factor, however, is not dispositive. It would have to be weighed at trial against many 
others factors, such as the fact that Plaintiff was assured by County officials prior to 
purchasing the land that a gravel pit operation would be allowed. (Rec. 167) 
The trial court never applied the Penn Central balancing test. The trial court 
found one factor - the legitimacy of the County's actions - dispositive. This is not a 
correct analysis under the Penn Central balancing test. The entry of summary judgment 
was therefore error. 
II. The Trial Court Erred In Granting Summary 
Judgment Based On Plaintiffs Purported Failure 
To Make A Meaningful Attempt To Satisfy 
The Requirements For A Gravel Pit Permit. 
The trial court made a factual finding that Plaintiff made no meaningful attempt to 
satisfy the requirements for a gravel pit permit because it failed to submit an 
environmental impact statement ("EIS"). The trial court erred in using this finding as a 
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basis for granting summary judgment because the facts concerning the EIS were hotly 
disputed and therefore not an appropriate basis for a summary judgment. 
Summary judgments can address only legal issues that arise out of undisputed 
facts. In determining whether a fact is disputed, the court must view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment: 
We liberally construe the facts and view the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion. ... It is inappropriate for courts 
to weigh disputed material facts in ruling on a summary judgment, 
[citations omitted] It matters not that the evidence on one side may appear 
to be strong or even compelling, [citation omitted] One sworn statement 
under oath is all that is needed to dispute the averments on the other side of 
the controversy and create an issue of fact, precluding the entiy of summary 
judgment. 
Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). 
Furthermore, "if there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of fact, the doubt 
should be resolved in favor of the opposing party." Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 
434, 436 (Utah 1982). 
The trial court made a factual finding that Plaintiff failed to satisfy the 
requirements for granting a gravel pit permit. Conceptually, this finding raises in an issue 
of "ripeness." Takings claims are not ripe until "until the government entity charged with 
implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the 
regulations to the property at issue." Williamson County Regional Planning Com'n v. 
Hamilton, 473 U.S. 172, 186, 105 S.Ct 3108, 3116 (U.S. 1985). 
Once it becomes clear that the regulatory authority will not allow the requested 
use of the property, the takings claim is ripe: 
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Williamson County and our other ripeness decisions do not impose further 
obligations on petitioner, for the limitations the wetland regulations 
imposed were clear from the Council's denial of his applications, and there 
is no indication that any use involving any substantial structures or 
improvements would have been allowed. Where the state agency charged 
with enforcing a challenged land-use regulation entertains an application 
from an owner and its denial of the application makes clear the extent of 
development permitted, and neither the agency nor a reviewing state court 
has cited noncompliance with reasonable state-law exhaustion or pre-permit 
processes [citation omitted], federal ripeness rules do not require the 
submission of further and futile applications with other agencies. 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 625-26, 121 S.Ct. 2448, 2462 (U.S 2001). 
The relevant question, then, is whether the County reached a final decision on the 
merits refusing Plaintiffs request for a gravel pit permit. The trial court ruled that the 
County never made such a determination because Plaintiff failed to submit a required 
environmental impact statement ("EIS"). The trial court, therefore, effectively held that 
Plaintiffs permit request was denied on procedural grounds, not because of an ultimate 
decision by the County that the zoning ordnance did not permit a gravel pit at that 
location. 
The trial court erred in making this finding because Plaintiff submitted ample, 
indeed overwhelming, evidence that the failure to submit an EIS played no role in the 
denial of the gravel pit permit application. The permit application was denied, on the 
merits, because the County decided that it did not want a gravel pit that close to the town 
of Stockton, and because the property contain the Stockton Bar, a rare geologic 
formation. The record shows that the County squarely addressed the merits of Plaintiff s 
request and decided that under no circumstances did it want a gravel pit at that location. 
While the County's Planning Commission did, at one point, request an EIS, Plaintiff 
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demonstrated that the requested EIS was not possible to produce, and in any event, that 
the lack of an EIS was never a reason for denying the permit application. The County 
denied the permit application for problems that, in its view, were inherent in the very 
nature of a gravel pit at that location. The evidence is truly overwhelming that the 
County was intent on denying Plaintiffs request, and the lack of an EIS played no role in 
that decision. 
Plaintiff has described the circumstances surrounding the denial of the permit 
request in detail in the Statement of Facts. Highlighted below a few of the most powerful 
facts showing that the failure to submit an EIS played no role in the denial of the permit 
application. 
The County denied Plaintiffs request on three separate occasion, and the lack of 
an EIS was never cited as a reason for any of those denials. The first denial was the 
failure to include Plaintiffs property in the new MG-EX zoning classification. The day 
after the Planning Commission held its first hearing on Plaintiffs permit request, the 
County issued a six-month moratorium on all mining permits so that it could study and 
revise the zoning ordinance. (Rec. 165) At the end of this moratorium, the County 
revised its zoning ordinance to create code a new MG-EX code for gravel pits. Plaintiffs 
property was not given this new zoning designation. (Rec. 165-64) This effectively 
denied Plaintiffs request, because if the County intended to allow a gravel pit on 
Plaintiffs property, it would have included that property in the new MG-EX zoning code. 
All subsequent actions on Plaintiffs permit request, including the request for an EIS, 
were nothing more than window dressing for a settled matter. 
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Despite seeing the writing on the wall, Plaintiff made two requests: (1) that the 
County reconsider its decision and re-zone Plaintiffs property MG-EX, or (2) that the 
County consider its permit request under the old zoning ordinance because that was the 
ordinance in effect at the time the permit application was submitted. The County agreed 
to do both. (Rec. 164) 
The County first considered Plaintiffs request to be re-zoned MG-EX. This 
request was denied, and critically, the County never required an EIS for this request. 
(Rec. 163-62) Thus, the County had now rejected Plaintiffs request to operate a gravel 
pit for the second time; first by not giving Plaintiffs land the new MG-EX zoning 
classification, and second, by denying Plaintiffs request that it be re-zoned MG-EX. The 
County acted in both these instances without even requesting an EIS, much less basing 
the rejection on the lack of an EIS, as the trial court found. 
The EIS cited by the trial court was requested solely connection with the 
alternative "grandfathered" request for consideration of the permit request under the old 
ordinance. While it is true Plaintiff did not submit the requested EIS, there are numerous 
facts showing that this played no role in the decision to deny that permit request: 
• As discussed above, the review of Plaintiff s grandfathered request was 
nothing more than a token gesture. The County had already decided against permitting a 
gravel pit on Plaintiffs land. 
• Plaintiff showed the County that the requested EIS was impossible to 
obtain. Plaintiff sought bids for the EIS from seven firms that had been approved by the 
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County and not a single one was able to perform all the tasks requested by the County. 
(Rec. 161,80-79) 
• The opposition to the gravel pit focused on two factors that were inherent in 
the proposed gravel pit: the proximity of the operation to the town of Stockton, and the 
existence of a geologic antiquity that many academics felt should not be disturbed. (Rec. 
72-69) No EIS could solve these problems. 
• The permit request was first considered by the Planning Commission, 
which made a recommendation to the County Commissioners. The Planning 
Commission issued a Findings Of Fact And Statement Of Law And Decision that 
recommended denying the permit request, but without ever stating that the lack of an EIS 
was a basis for denying the permit request. (Rec. 160, 66) Indeed, the Commission's 
staff had submitted a draft set of Findings that included the lack of an EIS as one of the 
reasons for denial. (Rec. 90) The Planning Commission, however, did not include that 
statement in the document it issued. (Rec. 160, 72) The Planning Commission, 
therefore, affirmatively rejected the suggestion that the lack of an EIS was a reason for 
recommending the denial of the permit request. 
• When the County voted to deny the permit request, the two Commissioners 
who voted to reject (one voted in favor) stated the reasons for their votes, and the lack of 
an EIS is never mentioned. Both focused on the proximity of the proposed gravel pit to 
the town of Stockton. (Rec. 64) 
If anything, the evidence is undisputed that the lack of an EIS played no role in the 
County's denial of the permit application. The decision to deny the permit is ultimately 
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made by the County Commissioners. Since the two Commissioners who voted to deny 
the permit never mentioned the lack of an EIS, one could argue that, as a matter of law, 
the lack of an EIS played no role in the denial of Plaintiff s permit request. It is beyond 
question, however, that the trial court erred in grounding summary judgment on a finding 
that Plaintiff did not meaningfully attempt to satisfy the requirements for a gravel permit 
because of the failure to submit an EIS.5 
III. The Trial Court Erred In Granting Summary 
Judgment Based On A Finding That There Are 
Other Economically Beneficial Uses Of The Property. 
The trial court made the following finding: 
The Property can be put to the same reasonable or economically beneficial 
uses it has historically had, and had at the time of the permit application. 
There is no evidence in the record for this finding, much less an undisputed record 
supporting this finding. Plaintiff submitted the Affidavit of Butch Johnson, a long time 
Utah realtor. After visiting the property and relying on his extensive experience, Mr. 
Johnson concluded that there are no economically viable uses of the property other than 
the extraction of gravel. (Rec. 158-56). This testimony creates a triable issue of fact that 
precludes summary judgment on this issue. 
5
 Even if the failure to provide an EIS were the reason for the Application's denial, 
Plaintiff would be entitled to pursue a takings claim based on the "futility" of securing an 
EIS. A plaintiff can claim a taking without fully complying with a permit procedure 
where "the procedure to acquire a permit is so burdensome as to effectively deprive 
plaintiffs of their property rights." Lakewood Associates v. U.S., 45 Fed.Cl. 320, 333 
(Fed.Cl. 1999). Accord, Gilbert v. City of Cambridge, 932 F.2d 51, 60-61 (1st Cir. 
1991). Here, the overwhelming public opposition to the Application, the enormous cost 
of obtaining an EIS, and Diamond's offer to abide by any terms imposed on other gravel 
pits, would allow trier of fact to find that obtaining the EIS would have been futile 
because the Application was not going to be granted under any circumstances. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reason stated in this brief, Plaintiff-Appellant Diamond B-Y Ranches 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's decision granting the 
defendant summary judgment, and remand this case for a trial on the merits. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DIAMOND B-Y RANCHES, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 01301122 
vs. : 
TOOELE COUNTY, et al., 
Defendants. : 
This matter came before the Court for oral argument on Tooele 
County7 s Motion for Summary Judgment on" April 24, 2003. Jody K. 
Burnett and Douglas J. Ahlstrom appearing on behalf of defendant 
Tooele County and Allen K. Young appearing on behalf of plaintiff, 
Diamond B-Y Ranches, the Court having heard arguments of counsel 
and reviewed the Memoranda submitted by respective counsel and 
having reviewed the supplemental briefs filed by the parties at 
this Court's request, hereby finds and rules as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This is an action to review Tooele County's ("County") 
denial of a conditional use permit for a sand and gravel extraction 
operation on Diamond B-Y's ("Diamond") property ("Property") 
located in Tooele County and within and abutting the town of 
0 276 ® 
DIAMOND B-Y RANCHES 
V. TOOELE COUNTY PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Stockton city limits. The Property was zoned MU-40 under the 
Uniform Zoning Ordinance of Tooele County ("Uniform Zoning 
Ordinance") at the time of Diamond's purchase, which provided, as 
a conditional use, gravel extraction operations under this zoning 
designation. 
2. Under the Uniform Zoning Ordinance, the following 
provisions are listed: 
7-1. Designation of Conditional Use ...a land use that, 
because of its unique characteristics or potential impact 
on the county, surrounding neighbor or adjacent land 
user, may not be compatible in some areas or may be 
compatible"only if "certain conditions are" required that 
mitigate or eliminate the detrimental impact. 
7-2. Permit Required. A conditional use permit shall be 
required for all uses listed as conditional uses in the 
zoning district regulations. 
7-3. No Presumption of Approval. The listing of a 
conditional use in any table of permitted and conditional 
uses found at the end of each chapter of this Uniform 
Zoning Ordinance of Tooele County for each category of 
zoning district does not constitute an assurance or 
presumption that such conditional use will be approved. 
Rather, each proposed conditional use shall be evaluated 
on an individual basis...in order to determine whether 
the conditional use is appropriate at the particular 
location. 
3. On July 12, 2 000, Geneva Rock Products, Inc. ("Geneva") 
applied for a conditional use permit to operate a gravel pit and 
related activity on the Property. 
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4. On July 19, 2000, the Tooele County Planning Commission 
("Planning Commission") tabled the application pending an 
environmental impact study ("EIS") in order to more fully evaluate 
the potential impact of the proposed conditional use. 
5. Geneva thereafter never provided the Planning Commission 
with an EIS. 
6. On January 16, 2001, Geneva assigned its interest in the 
Property to Diamond, and Diamond requested by letter dated January 
24, 2 001, that the County proceed with the conditional use permit 
application process. 
7. The Planning Commission subsequently issued a Statement 
of Findings of Fact and Statement of Law and Recommendation, which 
noted that the applicant did not intend to provide an EIS and that 
the lack of an EIS made the application incomplete and therefore 
the Planning Commission did not approve the application. 
8. In a letter dated June 11, 2001, Diamond's counsel 
notified the County it would not procure an EIS "in light of the 
cost and public opposition" and asked that the County make a final 
decision on the application. 
9. On July 18, 2 001, the Planning Commission denied the 
application. 
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10. On September 18, 2001, the Tooele Board of County 
Commissioners heard Diamond's appeal of the Planning Commission 
decision and likewise denied the conditional use permit. Diataxi 
thereafter commenced this lawsuit alleging an unlawful taking of 
private property without just compensation. 
RULING 
The designation of a conditional use is exactly as the name 
suggests, conditional upon the review and approval of the 
appropriate public body. Tooele's own definition of the term 
^conditional use" underscores both the conditional nature of the 
use and the lack of any presumption that a specified conditional 
use will be approved, as each requested use must be evaluated on an 
individual basis to determine its appropriateness. Accordingly, 
Diamond had no legitimate expectation that the permit it sought 
would be automatically approved and knew that it had to undertake 
an administrative process to have the conditional use permit 
reviewed by the appropriate public body. As such, both from a 
reading of the Zoning Ordinances and Utah case law, Diamond has no 
protected property interest in a conditional use. Western Land 
Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980). A 
unilateral expectation, which is all that Diamond can claim in view 
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of the County ordinances, is insufficient to create a property 
right under state law. Patterson v. American Fork City, 2 0 03 Utah 
7 (Utah 2003). As such, the County's denial of Diamond's 
conditional use permit application did not deprive Diamond of a 
protected property interest subject to compensation as a taking. 
Further, this is not an issue that needs a constitutional 
determination, as Diamond simply failed to provide the County with 
evidence to satisfy its burden for approval of a conditional use 
permit. Diamond failed to provide an EIS which was to address 
whether the conditional use permit was compatible with adjoining 
uses, and in the absence of such information the denial of the 
conditional use permit was neither arbitrary, capricious or 
illegal. In summary, Diamond made no meaningful attempt to satisfy 
the requirements for the granting of a conditional use permit and 
consequently received the inevitable denial of the application. 
Finally, even though it is unnecessary to the opinion, as 
Diamond had no protected property right in a conditional use, this 
Court sees no deprivation of reasonable or economically beneficial 
use of the Property by the denial of a conditional use permit. It 
is axiomatic that Diamond cannot argue that the denial of a 
conditional use of the Property somehow deprives it of all 
® 
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reasonable or economically beneficial use of the Property. The 
denial of a conditional expectancy does not extinguish the use to 
which the Property was put to before the application process was 
initiated. The Property can be put to the same reasonable or 
economically beneficial uses it has historically had, and had at 
the time of the permit application. The mere fact that Diamond 
purchased the Property with the unilateral expectation that it 
could obtain a conditional use of the Property, for something other 
than its then-existing use, does not create a deprivation of all 
xeasonable or economically beneficial use of the Property. 
Accordingly, Tooele's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
Mr. Burnett to prepare an Order consistent with the pleadings and 
this Decision. 
Dated this «22-day of May, 2003. 
RANDALL N. SKANCHY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
& 
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